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Over the last 40 years, social housing has become dominated by households on low incomes. 
However, there is a lack of recent research that quantifies residualisation, particularly the 
historical trends. This paper therefore presents an Index of Residualisation as a novel means 
of quantifying the changes. Using the Index, it is shown that, in 2010 social housing in the 
UK was three times more residualised than in 1970, but that residualisation has been broadly 
stable over the last 20 years. However, the UK government’s social housing reforms are 
likely to change the tenure significantly and the impact of these changes on residualisation 
needs to be monitored. The Index is ideally suited to this role, and can also be used to 
investigate the drivers of residualisation and conduct comparative studies. 
1. Introduction 
It is generally agreed that UK social housing has undergone a long period of residualisation. 
Residualisation is a complex phenomenon and is the subject of considerable debate, but has 
been defined as “the process whereby public housing [and other social housing] moves 
towards a position in which it provides only a ‘safety net’ for those who for reasons of 
poverty, age or infirmity cannot obtain suitable accommodation in the private sector” 
(Malpass & Murie, 1982, p. 174). The changes in the tenants that the sector houses and the 
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role it plays have occurred over more than 60 years, and have resulted in the sector moving 
from a ‘public housing’ model, providing housing for a broad spectrum of households, to a 
‘social housing’ model, housing only those unable to house themselves in the private market 
(Malpass & Victory, 2010). Furthermore, the current UK government is introducing 
substantive reforms to social housing, which are likely to further impact the sector. 
 
The aim of this research is to improve the understanding of these changes by analysing the 
shift in make-up of social housing tenants in terms of household income. While this is an area 
that was widely studied in the 1980s, recent quantitative analyses are more limited, and there 
is a lack of detailed analysis of long-term trends. After outlining the features of 
residualisation, the multiple and interlinking causes of the process are discussed. The 
subsequent sections of the paper focus on the quantification of residualisation, outlining 
previous literature and highlighting the need for a consistent measure of residualisation to 
enable analysis of trends and to aid comparative studies. 
 
A new Index of Residualisation is then presented, which enables precise measurement of 
residualisation in terms of tenant incomes. The Index is then used to compare the extent of 
residualisation among different tenures in the UK over the last 40 years. Potential uses of the 
Index are then outlined, including use in comparative studies, examining the different social 
rented sectors across Europe, for example. 
 
Residualisation comprises a range of features and influences, but at is heart is about a 
changing role for social housing. The original aim was that public housing would be a broad 
tenure, providing decent and affordable housing for the masses. Initially the focus was on the 
relatively affluent working classes, but provision soon expanded to provide for those on lower 
incomes. The vision was that public housing would cater for a wide cross-section of society: 
 
“If we are to enable citizens to lead a full life … they should all be drawn from different 
sections of the community. We should try to introduce what was always the lovely feature of 
English and Welsh villages, where the doctor, the grocer, the butcher and the farm labourer 
all lived in the same street … the living tapestry of a mixed community” (Aneurin Bevan, 
quoted in Berube, 2005, pp. 2-3). 
 
Public housing originally served households with a relatively wide range of incomes. By 
contrast, social housing is now increasingly seen as an “ambulance service” for those unable 
to support themselves (Harloe, 1978, p. 17). The current government has described social 
housing as giving “people the helping hand they need, when they need it” (DCLG, 2010). 
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These trends can be observed in across Europe, with social housing “widely understood to be 
in retreat and on the defensive” (p. 3, Malpass and Victory, 2010). Residualisation is a 
complex and multi-faceted process, relating to the role of social housing, its provision and 
consumption. It is associated with a downgrading in status of the tenure and is linked to issues 
of social exclusion, stigma and quality (Forrest and Murie, 1983). To emphasise any one 
aspect of the process risks missing this complexity, but a number of common (although not 
necessary) features of residualisation can nonetheless be identified. 
 
The key aspect of residualisation, as highlighted in the definition above, is the role that social 
housing plays in the wider housing system. It is this role and status that is reflected in a 
number of characteristics of the sector. Residualisation typically includes changing 
characteristics of social housing tenants: with rising levels of unemployment or economic 
inactivity and declining incomes in comparison with the population as a whole (Hills, 2007). 
Equally, a residualising sector is often in physical decline, both in terms of size and the 
quality of housing available (either through poor initial build quality, or failure to modernise 
housing as it ages; Clapham and MacLennan, 1983). In tenures governed by municipal or 
central government policy, residualisation is often reflected in policy decisions, for example 
restrictive allocations policies and declining state investment (Malpass, 1983). 
 
Residualisation is also associated with less tangible issues of stigma and perceived quality. 
The issue is not solely one of practical changes, but a decline in how the tenure is viewed both 
by tenants and society as a whole (Forrest and Murie, 1983). This is of particular important 
because housing is related to “social position, reputation and stigma, access to services and to 
jobs, social cohesion at the neighbourhood level, and hence to life chances for the citizen” 
(Pawson & Kintrea, 2002, p. 646), and therefore a residualising sector may increase social 
exclusion. 
 
It should be noted at this point that although the literature around residualisation concentrates 
on social housing, it is not necessarily a tenure specific phenomenon. Any tenure could 
become residualised and any changes in one tenure will inherently affect other tenures. 
However, “it is in the council housing sector where these residualising forces find their most 
concentrated expression” (p. 464, Forrest and Murie, 1983). 
1.1.1. Modernisation 
These various interdependent aspects constitute the process of the residualisation of social 
housing, which has been described as a downgrading of the tenure (Forrest and Murie, 1983). 
However, this needs to be seen in the context of a wider process of modernisation (Malpass & 
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Victory, 2010). Residualisation has occurred alongside a wider restructuring of social 
housing, which has seen a shift in ownership from municipal authorities to a wider mix of 
providers, such as housing associations, and the greater use of private finance. There has also 
been greater emphasis on resident involvement and choice, with a move away from viewing 
tenants as passive welfare recipients to regarding them as empowered consumers. Equally, 
there has been considerable work to improve the quality of social housing stock through the 
Decent Homes Programme (National Audit Office 2010). The ‘‘discourse of decline’’ (p. 4, 
Malpass & Victory, 2010) that has characterised the residualisation literature, is therefore too 
simplistic; the changes are part of a wider transition, not simply a downgrading. 
1.2. Causes of residualisation 
Residualisation has occurred through a wide range of interlinked influences, but broadly 
speaking the process has been driven by tenure restructuring, compounded by social and 
demographic factors, and supported by government policy. 
1.2.1. Tenure restructuring 
Since the start of the 20th century, the tenure structure in the UK has changed dramatically 
(Figure 1). The social housing sector grew rapidly, particularly following the Second World 
War, while homeownership also expanded rapidly. Simultaneously, the private rented sector 
went into decline. These changes had a profound impact on social housing as it developed. 
---------------- 
FIGURE 1 
---------------- 
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Rise in homeownership 
In the earlier years of council housing, the sector was the tenure of choice for many working 
class households, providing as it did an affordable high quality home. However, as owner 
occupation became increasingly accessible to even affluent working class households 
(through the growth in mortgage availability and rising real incomes), homeownership 
became an important aspiration. Later on, rising house prices made owner occupation an 
attractive investment as well as a consumption good. These factors firmly secured 
homeownership as the tenure of choice for a significant proportion of society.  
 
Social housing has therefore become only for those unable to take advantage of these benefits. 
In fact Malpass and Victory (2010) argue that as access to and aspiration for homeownership 
have grown alongside public housing from the start, social housing has always been, to some 
extent, a residual sector, in that it provided for those unable to effectively access the private 
market. 
 
Decline in private renting 
Alongside the growth in homeownership, the private rented sector declined rapidly until the 
late 1980s, in part due to strict rent controls, which made private landlordism an unattractive 
investment. Equally, there was a significant reduction in demand: as homeownership became 
increasingly accessible, people opted to buy rather than rent. Furthermore, there were 
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programmes of slum clearance particularly during the 1960s to eradicate the worst private 
rented housing. In addition to its declining size, the sector was also relatively inaccessible, as 
high security of tenure meant that turnover in the sector was very low (Murie, 2009). These 
factors combined to reduce the capacity of the sector to house lower income households. This 
role then fell increasingly to the social rented sector (Murie, 2009). 
 
However, in recent years the private rented sector has flourished in a climate of deregulation 
and affordability problems preventing many people accessing homeownership. The buy to let 
boom saw a massive growth in supply, which has been met by demand from those unable to 
access either owner occupation or social housing due to various constraints. 
1.2.2. Social and economic factors 
Forrest and Murie (1983) also point out that much of the change in household incomes and 
employment statuses is linked to labour market restructuring. The collapse of traditional 
manufacturing industries has disproportionately impacted social housing tenants who were far 
more likely to have been employed by these industries. These workers have found themselves 
unemployed with far fewer job prospects locally and a skill set that does not match the needs 
of the modern economy.  
1.2.3. Role of government 
In addition to these wider structural factors, residualisation has been compounded by 
government policy. However it is important to recognise that these policies were not 
sufficient to fundamentally shape housing tenures, but nonetheless interact. Some theories of 
residualisation “grossly [overrate] the power of the state to transform the situation of 
consumers” (Malpass, 1990, p. 26)  
 
Wider context of welfare 
Housing has been described as the wobbly pillar of the welfare state (Torgersen, 1987), never 
having had the same legitimacy or status as the NHS or education. This arises because 
housing is viewed more as a commodity than a social right and therefore market approaches 
have typically been favoured (Murie, 1997). Even from the outset, the move towards public 
housing provision was the result of a reluctant acknowledgement that the private sector was 
unable to meet housing need, rather than a particular favouring of public housing per se 
(Burnett, 1986). 
 
This situation was exacerbated in the 1970s, with a growing shift towards a residual model of 
welfare, which views the market and the family as the main providers, with the state 
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intervening only to support those unable to access support from these sources. This was 
driven in part by concerns regarding fiscal spending and subsequent retrenchment in public 
expenditure (Flynn, 1988) and has led to an emphasis on individual subsidies (e.g. Housing 
Benefit) rather than direct provision of housing (Cole & Furbey, 1994).  
 
Incentivising homeownership 
This approach to housing and welfare has also demonstrated itself in the promotion by 
successive governments of homeownership as the tenure of choice and aspiration, at the 
expense of social housing. It has been actively incentivised through a variety of government 
schemes and fiscal incentives (Flynn, 1988). Tax advantages – particularly the abolition of the 
Schedule A tax on imputed rented in 1963 – given to homeowners amount to a subsidy 
comparable in size to Housing Benefit expenditure (Diacon et al., 2010). 
 
Social housing tenants have also directly been incentivised to become homeowners through 
the Right to Buy. Giving tenants the right to purchase their council house at a substantial 
discount enabled many tenants to enter homeownership: in the first five years of the 
legislation, 460,000 properties (ten per cent of local authority stock) were sold in England 
(DCLG, 2013b). Right to Buy sales declined from the early 1990s, but by 2008, one third of 
social housing had been sold to former tenants (Murie, 2008). Those able to purchase their 
properties were typically better-off tenants, so those left in the sector were increasingly from 
the lower income groups (Forrest & Murie, 1988). 
 
Reduced investment in social housing 
At the same time, social housing investment and provision have exhibited downward trends. 
In 2009, construction of social housing in the UK was only 13 per cent of its 1954 peak and 
30 per cent of the level when the Right to Buy was introduced (DCLG, 2013a). The coalition 
government has also reduced the affordable housing grant from £8.4bn for the period 2008-
11, to £4.5bn for the period 2011-15 (HCA, n.d.), with the aim of maintaining the level of 
provision, but at reduced grant per unit, with the remainder made up through increased rents. 
These more recent reductions are reflective of longer-term declines in subsidy.  
 
The combination of reduced provision, sales (including the Right to Buy) and demolitions has 
led to a significant decline in the size of the sector. In 1981, over 30 per cent of households 
(5.5 million) lived in public housing; but by 2010 housed only 17 per cent of households (3.8 
million; DCLG, 2011a). 
 
Allocations policies 
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Furthermore, allocation policies have prioritised the poorest and most vulnerable tenants in 
granting tenancies. Needs-based allocation of social housing first came to prominence in the 
1969 Cullingworth Report and quickly became accepted as good practice (Mullins & Murie, 
2006). Prior to this, allocation prioritised “skilled workers needed by industry and others 
whose rehousing would benefit the community” (p. 647 Pawson & Kintrea, 2002). In addition 
to directly restricting access for better-off households, it has been argued that allocations 
policies also contribute to residualisation as they make applying for social housing a last 
resort, as applicants are only “those desperate enough to throw themselves onto the mercy of 
public bureaucracy” (p. 659, Pawson & Kintrea, 2002). 
2. Quantifying residualisation 
Given the complexities of residualisation, a means of calibrating the process would be useful. 
However, the multi-dimensional nature of residualisation makes quantification problematic. 
To engage in quantification, it is therefore necessary to identify individual features (or a 
combination of a few features) that lend themselves to numerical analysis. Different 
approaches have been adopted in the literature, but the dominant approach has been to 
examine the characteristics of tenants. This is not to suggest that residualisation is simply 
about changing tenant characteristics, but rather that this is a useful indicator, as it is strongly 
associated with the process as a whole. 
 
A study of Census data from 1961-1981 reveals significant changes in the socio-economic 
group of social tenants (Hamnett, 19841). The proportion of professionals, employers and 
managers in social housing remained constant, despite an overall increase across the 
population; conversely, the proportion of semi-skilled and unskilled workers in social housing 
increased by 30 per cent and 44 per cent respectively. 
 
However, the use of both Census data and socio-economic group to measure residualisation 
has been criticised by Bentham (19861). Census data is collected every ten years and so 
cannot provide a detailed picture of change and data will be ten years old by the time the next 
update is possible. Socio-economic group is also increasingly unhelpful in understanding 
residualisation as only the head of household is considered: the increase in multiple-earner 
households and retired heads of households means socio-economic group does not necessarily 
reflect the circumstances of the household. The change in the classification system of socio-
economic group further complicates the possibility of time-series analysis. 
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Instead, Bentham (1986) used Family Expenditure Survey data to measure the change in 
income of households from 1953 to 1983: over this period there was an increase of nearly 140 
per cent in the proportion of households in social housing drawn from the lowest income 
quartile and a 66 per cent decrease in the proportion of households drawn from the highest 
quartile. Residualisation has also been quantified by the number of households in receipt of 
welfare benefits. Between 1967 and 1984 the percentage of supplementary benefit recipients 
living in social housing rose from 45 per cent to 61 per cent (Forrest & Murie, 1983). 
 
More recently, analysis of Labour Force Survey data from 1981 and 2006 revealed that while 
in 1981, 67 per cent of working age householders in social housing were in full-time work, by 
2006 this figure had halved to 34 per cent (Hills, 2007). There was also a five-fold increase in 
economic inactivity in social housing due to permanent sickness or disablement: from five per 
cent in 1981 to 25 per cent in 2006. Lupton et al. (2009) also quantified residualisation 
through the creation of an Index of Advantage, which assessed the effect on children’s 
outcomes of living in social housing over four cohorts born between 1946 and 2000. In the 
earliest cohort, children living in social housing were from a range of backgrounds, with 11 
per cent from the most advantaged group and 27 per cent from the least advantaged. By 2000, 
only two per cent were from the most advantaged group and 49 per cent were from the least 
advantaged. 
 
These studies provide strong evidence of residualisation and go some way to showing the 
extent of those changes. However, there is a lack of detailed quantification of residualisation 
particularly in more recent years and a limited understanding of the course and magnitude of 
the changes. The aim of this paper is therefore to provide precise quantification the course of 
residualisation over the last 40 years. In particular we present a new Index of Residualisation, 
which enables the precise comparison over different years, tenures and geographies. Of the 
approaches used in the literature, the Index uses household income as its primary measure 
because it is simple, widely available and most readily supports comparisons over time and 
national contexts. It also allows for a nuanced analysis, as the data are relatively continuous, 
in comparison with making a discrete distinction between a limited number of categories (e.g. 
employed, unemployed and economically inactive). Importantly, it is the least susceptible of 
the measures to the distorting effects of government policies. As highlighted above, socio-
economic categories can change, either making comparisons impossible, or creating artificial 
changes that do not reflect the underlying reality. Equally, changes to eligibility for benefit or 
different benefit systems between countries limit the possibility of comparisons. 
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3. Index of Residualisation 
The Index of Residualisation compares the incomes of those living in a particular tenure with 
the incomes of the population as a whole. If a particular tenure houses disproportionately 
more households with lower incomes, this indicates residualisation.  
 
The Index is based on the Suits index of tax progressivity (Suits, 1977), which is in turn 
derived from the Gini coefficient. The Gini coefficient is a well-established measure of 
inequality, which measures the distribution of incomes within a population using a cumulative 
frequency distribution (Figure 2). In a population with total income equality (i.e. all 
households having the same income), the graph will resemble straight line OB. In a 
population where some households have a greater income than others, the graph curves below 
line OB and will resemble OCB. The Gini coefficient is the ratio between the area under the 
curve for a given population and the area given total income equality. 
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The Suits Index uses a similar principle to measure the distributional effects of taxation, by 
comparing the percentage of income received by households with the proportion of the tax 
burden paid (Figure 3). Straight line OB represents a tax that is paid proportionally by all 
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households, regardless of income (e.g. a flat rate income tax with no lower income threshold). 
Line OCB is an example of a progressive tax, one for which the tax burden is borne more by 
wealthier households (e.g. many property taxes). 
--------------- 
FIGURE 3 
--------------- 
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The key difference between the Suits Index and the Gini coefficient is that curves can go 
above the line of proportionality. This occurs when the tax burden falls more heavily on 
poorer households. Line ODB is an example of a regressive tax (e.g. a sales and excise tax). 
Like the Gini coefficient, the Suits Index calculates the ratio between the area under the curve 
and the area given proportionality. 
 
The Index of Residualisation takes the structure of these well-established indices and applies 
them to the income distribution of households within a tenure in comparison with the wider 
population. For any household income, we can ascertain the proportion of households in a 
population and sub-population that have an income below this amount. By plotting these 
values against each other we can compare the income distributions of populations and sub-
populations (Figure 4). When the income distribution of the sub-population is equivalent to 
that of the whole population, the graph forms straight line OB. If the sub-population is 
predominantly of a lower income, then the line will resemble OCB; if the sub-population is 
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predominantly of a higher income, then the line will resemble ODB. The Index is then 
calculated by measuring the ratio between the area under the curve for a sub-population and 
area OAB. 
--------------- 
FIGURE 4 
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3.1. Calculation 
The area under the curve for any given sub-population can be calculated as follows: 
, 
where p is the percentage of households in the population, s is the percentage of households in 
the sub-population and F is the function of the curve. To calculate the Index of 
Residualisation, the following formula is used.  
 
K is the area under the curve in a situation of proportionality (OAB). 
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In this general case, the variables are continuous and a formula is given for the curve. 
However, in practice only discrete values will be known, and calculations can be completed 
by dividing population incomes into bands such as deciles or percentiles. In this analysis, 
household income was split into population deciles. In this case, the equation approximates as 
follows: 
, 
where pi is the proportion of households in the population at or below point pi and Fs(pi) is the 
proportion of households in the sub-population (or tenure) at or below point pi. 
4. Residualisation in the UK 
Having developed the Index, we then used it to analyse the changes in residualisation of 
social housing in comparison with the other tenures in the UK over the last 40 years. 
4.1. Method  
The data source selected was the Family Expenditure Survey and its subsequent forms (ONS, 
2013a, 2013b, 2013c). The survey contains tenure and income data over 40 years, allowing 
long-term trends to be analysed. This is important because there has been evidence of 
residualisation as early as the 1950s (Bentham, 1986; Clapham, 2005). Although the dataset 
does not allow for the study of the earliest stages of residualisation, it covers key changes, 
such as the introduction of the Right to Buy. Between 1970 and 2010, an average of 7,000 
households took part in the surveys annually.  
 
From the survey, the main tenures (owner occupation (mortgaged and outright), social 
housing and private renting) were compared, with the income variable being average gross 
weekly household income. This was equivalised on the basis of household composition using 
the OECD modified scale1 to account for changing household composition and differences in 
household composition between tenures. 
4.2. Results 
In 1970, social housing tenants were drawn from across the income spectrum, with only a 
slight preponderance of lower incomes households (Figure 5; although deciles were used in 
                                                     
1 For this scale, the first adult in a household counts as one unit, each subsequent adult as 0.5 and each 
child (under 15) as 0.3 units. The FES data counted those under 16 as children, so the equivalence 
calculations are not completely accurate, but are likely to be representative. 
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calculations, quintiles are shown in the graphs for clarity). Around ten per cent of households 
in social housing were from the wealthiest fifth of the population. By 2010, half of social 
housing tenants were from the poorest fifth of the population and less than two per cent from 
the wealthiest fifth. Residualisation is evident from the start of the dataset studied, with an 
increasing preponderance of lower income households from 1970 onwards. This accelerated 
in the early 1980s, reaching a peak in 1991, with over half of households in social housing 
being drawn from the poorest fifth. After this peak, the level of residualisation has plateaued. 
--------------- 
FIGURE 5 
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These changes in social housing can be compared with changes that occurred in the other 
tenures over the period. The income profile of owner occupiers remained fairly constant, 
averaging ten per cent of households from the poorest fifth of the population, 22 per cent from 
the middle fifth and 28 per cent from the richest fifth (Figure 6).  
--------------- 
FIGURE 6 
--------------- 
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Given the large size of the owner-occupied sector (accounting for between 51 and 71 per cent 
of households across the period studied) it is instructive to separate out mortgaged and 
outright owners (Figures 7 and 8 respectively). Mortgaged owner occupiers have significantly 
higher incomes than outright owners (reflecting the fact that many outright owners will be 
retired). However, the low housing costs associated with outright ownership will mitigate 
lower incomes. Mortgaged owner occupiers have by far the highest incomes of any tenure, 
with 60 per cent of households in the top 40 per cent of earners, a figure that has stayed fairly 
constant since the late 1970s.  
--------------- 
FIGURE 7 
--------------- 
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Outright owners are drawn from across the income spectrum, but with some trends over time 
observable. There was a slight trend away from the households with the highest incomes over 
the period studied. In terms of those on the lowest incomes, there is significant decrease 
between 1970 (23 per cent) and 1985 (10 per cent), with a partial reversal of this trend by 
2010 (17 per cent). 
--------------- 
FIGURE 8 
--------------- 
17 of 29 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
2
1
9
7
4
1
9
7
6
1
9
7
8
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
2
1
9
8
4
1
9
8
6
1
9
8
8
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
2
1
9
9
4
1
9
9
6
1
9
9
8
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
5th quintile (richest)
4th quintile
3rd quintile
2nd quintile
1st quintile 
(poorest)
 
Private rented housing has shown more year-on-year fluctuation than the other two tenures 
(although this is probably a statistical artefact due to the smaller sample size), but the overall 
proportions has remained relatively constant (Figure 9). The tenure accommodates 
households with a wide range of incomes, but with a slightly higher proportion of low earners 
(around 30 per cent are in the bottom 20 per cent of earners). 
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The figures above offer useful insights into each of the tenures, but it is difficult from these 
alone to be clear about the extent of residualisation or to make effective comparisons between 
the tenures. The Index of Residualisation calculations enable this analysis. Figure 10 shows 
the extent of residualisation for each tenure between 1970 and 2008, calculated using the 
Index. For social housing, there is increasing residualisation over the period. From being a 
fairly mixed-income tenure in 1970, residualisation is quite rapid, increasing in pace after 
1980 (probably linked to the introduction of the Right to Buy), reaching a level of around 0.5, 
more than three times the value in 1970.  
 
However, since 1991 the Index value has remained at this level, indicating that residualisation 
is not the significant driving force in the tenure that it once was. This is in line with other 
research suggesting that the peak period of residualisation has passed (e.g. Lee and Murie, 
1997; Murie, 2006). This plateau is interesting because this has occurred in spite of 
continuing pressures from various policies. However, the structural changes (labour market 
restructuring, growth of homeownership, etc) are not as significant as previously, suggesting 
that policy pressures have had a much less impact on residualisation than structural factors. 
Furthermore, there are additional factors that offer some explanation for the plateau. First, 
restricted access to social housing means that many low-income households remain in the 
private rented sector, limiting how far the sector can further residualise. Second, a significant 
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number of higher-income social tenants remain in the sector, either by choice or constraint. 
Third, the expansion of owner occupation has meant that even households on low incomes, 
have accessed homeownership, reducing the pool of poorer households seeking to access 
social housing. Research has found that around half of those living in poverty are 
homeowners (Burrows & Wilcox, 2000). 
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Private rented housing has shown a fairly stable Index figure of 0.15, indicating a slight 
preponderance of lower income households, but not a significant one. This reflects the fact 
that the private rented sector is very diverse, with landlords operating at both the very top and 
bottom of the housing market. Given the expansion of the sector since the late 1980s, it is 
interesting that the composition of the sector has not been affected: growth has come from 
across the income spectrum. 
 
Owner occupation has a slightly preponderance of higher income households, with an average 
Index value of -0.19 (only slightly greater in magnitude than the value for private renting. 
This reflects the fact that, with nearly 70 per cent of households in owner occupation, there 
will be a significant number of lower income households within the sector. However, by 
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separating out outright and mortgaged owners, it is possible to see the significant difference 
between the two groups: the Index value for outright owners fluctuates around 0 to 0.1 
(suggesting a very mixed income group), whereas the value for mortgaged owners is -0.3 to -
0.4, indicating a significant preponderance of those on high incomes. 
5. Discussion 
Over the last 40 years, social housing has moved from being a tenure with a wide range of 
incomes to one that is predominantly for households with low incomes. Previous studies have 
suggested that this trend began even before than the scope of the present data (Bentham, 
1986). This research confirms the findings of the previous studies into residualisation and 
provides new clarity into the course of the changes that have taken place. It also suggests that 
policy factors have had a limited effect on the characteristics of social housing tenants, 
emphasising the importance of structural causes of residualisation. Nevertheless policy can 
have an important role to play, as demonstrated in the acceleration of residualisation 
following the introduction of the Right to Buy. 
5.1. Use of the Index 
However, the most significant contribution of this research is the development of the Index of 
Residualisation, which can accurately chart changes in households in different tenures for the 
purposes of monitoring and comparative analysis. In addition to the data presented here, there 
is a wide range of ways in which the Index of Residualisation could be used to develop 
understanding of the changes occurring in social housing.  
5.1.1. Monitoring 
Although residualisation has been static for 20 years, the Coalition Government’s recent 
policy interventions are likely to significantly affect the sector. The Localism Act (2011) 
removes the automatic granting of tenancies for life to new social tenants, with landlords 
being able to additionally offer fixed-term tenancies of a short as two years, with the aim of 
freeing up social housing for those most in need (DCLG, 2010). At the end of a fixed term, 
households considered no longer to be in need may not have their tenancy renewed. This may 
mean many better-off tenants leave social housing and find accommodation in the private 
sector, reducing income variation and increasing residualisation. 
 
The introduction of Affordable Rent (housing provided by social landlords, with rents of up to 
80 per cent of market rent) in 2011 may also affect residualisation. It has been suggested that 
Affordable Rent could be accessible to slightly more affluent households than current social 
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tenants (House of Commons Library, 2011). This could create two tiers within social housing, 
with traditional social housing becoming further residualised, and Affordable Rent being less 
so. There have also been moves by some local authorities to prioritise working households on 
waiting lists, to incentivise households to seek work (e.g. Wandsworth Borough Council, 
2011; London Borough of Newham Council, 2011), which may further mitigate 
residualisation. This move has received support from central government (DCLG, 2011b). 
 
Tracking the changing income mix of social tenants using the Index will enable researchers 
and policymakers to monitor the impact of these changes. Given the potential negative effects 
of residualisation, it is vital that policy outcomes are monitored. Alongside policy factors, 
changing demographic and economic pressures may alter the composition of social housing. 
By monitoring trends, the Index will enable a clearer understanding of how these drivers 
affect residualisation.  
5.1.2. Comparative research 
The research presented here used the Index for a comparative study of tenure. However the 
Index has potential for use in other types of comparative research. There are substantial 
differences between local housing markets, which are likely to affect the nature of social 
housing in those areas. In areas with high housing costs, social rents represent a far greater 
discount relative to the market than in areas with low housing costs. Equally, although many 
areas have long waiting lists, there are areas where there is low demand for social housing. 
Given these different operating conditions, differences in the profile of social tenants are 
likely. 
 
The social housing stock is also far from uniform, comprising a wide range of property types 
in a variety of different neighbourhoods. It has been suggested that not only is social housing 
the tenure of the poorest households, but that within social housing, the poorest households 
live in the worst housing and in the worst areas (Pawson & Kintrea, 2002). By gathering low-
level income data through techniques such as small area estimation, it would be possible to 
use the Index to investigate this proposition. Such small-level spatial analysis has been useful 
in understanding the impact of the Right to Buy on social housing estates (Murie, 2008), any 
area where the Index could add further value. 
 
Furthermore, despite the variety of different approaches to social housing in Europe 
residualisation has been identified as a common theme across many countries (Scanlon & 
Whitehead, 2007). The Index could be used to compare the social housing in different 
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countries, and may provide further insight into which policy, demographic and socio-
economic factors have the greatest impact on residualisation. 
5.2. Evaluating the Index 
The Index provides a novel and precise quantification of residualisation, and is useful for 
monitoring the impact of policy and social changes, and for comparative research. It is built 
on established indices, which have important properties and uses, but offers a novel use of 
their underlying logic. Furthermore it overcomes the limitations of simpler measures (e.g. 
comparison of median income) by considering the distribution as well as level of income. Sen 
(1976) noted the importance of such distributional effects in constructing indices to measure 
phenomena such as poverty. However, residualisation is a complex phenomenon and there are 
a number of important considerations to make when interpreting the Index. 
5.2.1. Income as a measure of residualisation 
As highlighted above, there are limitations to using income as a proxy for residualisation. As 
Forrest and Murie (1983) point out, “neither the size of the sector, the quality of the stock, the 
particular tenant groups nor the specific features of policy are in themselves determining or 
necessary factors in the residualisation of council housing” (p. 464). However, tenant 
characteristics, and particularly income, are most commonly used in the literature to identify 
residualisation and are strongly associated with the change. This highlights the importance of 
not using the Index in isolation, but in the context of the wider literature on residualisation.  
5.2.2. Income inequality 
Using income distribution to measure residualisation does not take into account the overall 
level of income inequality in the population. In a society with high levels of inequality, the 
difference between the richest and poorest deciles will be much higher than in a society with 
greater equality, but this difference in financial resources will not be reflected in the Index. 
This is particularly important as the period over which residualisation has occurred is one of 
widening inequality in the UK (Murie, 2009). 
5.2.3. Tenure size 
The value of the Index for any given tenure is limited by the size of that tenure. As the size of 
a tenure increases, the maximum possible Index value decreases, as even at its most 
residualised, a very large tenure must, by definition, house some more affluent households. A 
better understanding of the Index can therefore be facilitated by calculating the maximum 
value of the Index for a tenure, given its size. This can then be used as a point of comparison 
with its actual Index value. For example, in the UK 68 per cent of households are owner 
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occupiers; if this tenure was at its most residualised, these households would be the poorest 
68 per cent of households. By calculating the Index based on this hypothetical figure, we 
obtain the maximum residualisation of the tenure: in this case a value of 0.317 (in comparison 
with the actual value of -0.161 for the tenure). 
5.2.4. Income grouping 
The calculation of the Index using income groupings is an approximation to the true Index 
value. The broader the groupings, the further the approximation is from the true Index value.  
In this research, income deciles were used. However, a better approximation would be given 
using percentiles. The impact on the Index value given by different band widths should be 
considered when interpreting the Index. 
5.2.5. Measures of income 
Another important consideration is the measure of income used for calculating the Index. This 
study used gross household income, which was adjusted to account for household size. This 
adjustment goes some way to assessing the resources available to that household to meet its 
needs (for which income is a proxy). However, it also ignores the impact of income taxation, 
which typically places a significantly lower burden on lower-income households.  
 
The impact of housing costs on the disposable incomes of households is another important 
consideration. The more households spend on housing costs, the less disposable income they 
will have. Given the housing costs of social housing tenants are on average significantly 
lower than those of private tenants and mortgaged homeowners, they need a lower income to 
maintain a similar standard of living. Therefore, using the Index to compare income after 
housing costs may well reveal a different picture from that of income before housing costs. 
 
In their recent paper, Stephens and van Steen (2011) develop this idea further to calculate the 
housing resources of different households. They examine the impact on income of taxation, 
welfare payments, housing costs and economic benefits derived from living in a particular 
tenure (e.g. capital gains by homeowners) to quantify the resources available to households. 
They point out that “it is necessary to look beyond income to capture fully the distribution of 
resources” (p. 1035) and their measure goes some way to quantifying these resources. 
 
The Index would adapt well to use with more complex measures of income and resources 
such as this, and these would enable a fuller understanding of the level of residualisation. The 
focus in this research on tracking historical trends meant that less comprehensive data were 
available, so more basic measures of income were used. However, for other studies, the use of 
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the housing resources measure when calculating the Index may provide a clearer picture of 
residualisation. 
6. Conclusion 
The Index of Residualisation provides a precise and novel presentation of the income 
distribution of households within tenures. The changes in the profile of households in social 
housing in the last 40 years have been charted, revealing a three-fold increase in 
residualisation over the period. Although over the last two decades there has been little 
increase in residualisation, this may change due to recent policy developments. Given the 
impact of residualisation, an effective means to monitor the changes that are occurring is 
vital. 
 
In addition to monitoring the impact of policy, the Index provides data needed to inform 
evidence-based discussions into the purpose of social housing. The increase in residualisation 
over the last 40 years has not been the product of a coherent government agenda, but rather 
has developed in an unsystematic manner, as the result of a variety of different influences, 
with governments responding to different opportunities presented by the housing market and 
political context (Malpass & Victory, 2010). 
 
Social housing today is very different from its initial vision, but its new role has not been 
clearly articulated. A changing role for social housing is not necessarily undesirable: 
residualisation has in part been caused by many of the poorest and most vulnerable 
households moving into social housing from the private rented sector, which has also 
provided them with security and affordability. However, if a more residual targeted approach 
is preferred then this must be complemented by an effective strategy to tackle the negative 
effects of residualisation. If the sector is to be effective both for its tenants, society and the 
economy as a whole, there needs to be an evidence base to underpin a strategic policy 
approach. The Index provides an important part of such an evidence base. 
7. Notes 
1 It should be noted that both Hamnett (1984) and Bentham (1986) refer to socio-tenurial 
polarisation rather than residualisation per se. However, these to constructs are closely linked, 
and for the purposes of measurement are instructive for the analysis of measurement.  
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9. Figures 
FIGURE 1: Tenure trend: percentage of households by tenure, England, 1971-2010 
Source: DCLG, 2011a, 2013c 
 
FIGURE 2: Gini coefficient 
 
FIGURE 3: Suits Index of tax progressivity 
 
FIGURE 4: Comparison of the household incomes of a population and sub-population 
 
FIGURE 5: Income profile of social housing tenants 
 
FIGURE 6: Income profile of owner occupiers 
 
FIGURE 7: Income profile of mortgaged owner occupiers 
 
FIGURE 8: Income profile of outright owner occupiers 
 
FIGURE 9: Income profile of private tenants 
 
FIGURE 10: Index of Residualisation by tenure 
